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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLEES ARE CONFUSED WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUES AND 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS. 
In their Brief, the Appellees have stated the issues before this court so as to re-phrase 
the actual effect and purpose of their lawsuit, which is to privately enforce technical 
provisions of the Utah Insurance Code and other laws against two automobile dealers1. 
Despite Appellees' arguments, this is not a breach of contract action and should not be 
considered as such2. Appellants have challenged the propriety of this class action lawsuit by 
challenging the adequacy of Appellees' claims. Accordingly, there are two overriding issues 
that this court is being asked to address: namely (1) whether Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-15-105 
provides a private right of action for enforcement of the Insurance Code by private 
individuals as opposed to the insurance commissioner and (2) whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in certifying the various classes in light of the facts presented. 
II. THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT OF APPELLATE RULE 24 IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THIS APPEAL AS THERE ARE NO FACTUAL 
FINDINGS BEING CHALLENGED. 
Appellees cite to the marshaling requirement of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure numerous times in their brief. Such citation is without merit. Rule 
lMike Riddle Mitsubishi and Midway Auto Plaza are now defunct companies and are 
no longer doing business. 
2Appellees are careful to omit any reference to the fact that there has been absolutely 
no allegation that the GAP or VTP products have not been delivered as promised or that any 
of the various benefits contracted for by the Appellees have not been provided as promised. 
1 
24(a)(9) states that "a party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. Rule 24 (2008). This appeal does not 
challenge any factual finding. This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to dismiss based 
on statutory construction and the trial court's certification of classes, a discretionary 
preliminary determination of the trial court. No factual issues have been determined by the 
fact finder and, as such, there is no marshaling requirement. 
Furthermore, and as a point of clarification, Appellees' statements relating to the 
allegations of Appellees' motions and complaints being construed as true are misleading to 
the extent that they imply that those additional "facts" presented by Appellants in connection 
with the Motions to Certify should not be considered. Furthermore, Appellees' so called 
"factual" statements containing legal conclusions, such as duties owed, etc., are not properly 
considered as "facts" for any purpose. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) 
("While a court ...must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [it is] not 
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S.Ct 1937, 1950 (2009)("Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of 
the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 
couched as a factual allegation."). 
III. APPELLEES' ARGUMENT RELATING TO CHALLENGING THE "OTHER 
INSURANCE CAUSES OF ACTION" ON APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT AS 
THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT THE SINGLE COMMON 
QUESTION REGARDING APPELLEES' GAP AND VTP CLAIMS IS 
WHETHER THE POLICIES VIOLATE THE UTAH INSURANCE CODE. 
Appellees argue that "[Appellants] did not request dismissal of the contract rescission 
causes of action in the trial court and the trial court's ruling did not address them." However, 
2 
in certifying the VTP classes, the trial court specifically acknowledged that the one and only 
question that applies to all members of the VTP classes is "whether the defendants' vehicle 
theft policies violate the Utah Insurance Code and, if so, which legal remedies are available." 
(ROA 2164,2177). Similarly, with regard to certifying the GAP classes, the trial specifically 
acknowledged that the one and only question that applies to all members of the GAP class 
was "do the [Appellants]' GAP policies violate the Utah Insurance Code, and if so, which 
legal remedies are available to the members of the class?" (ROA 2165-67). The GAP and 
VTP classes, and attendant causes of action, were certified only based on the single common 
question of whether they violate the provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. Accordingly, 
Appellants' Motion to Dismiss necessarily incorporates all of the VTP and GAP claims since 
the classes do not exist without the common question of whether Appellants may enforce the 
provisions of the Insurance Code, above and beyond the terms found within the GAP and 
VTP contracts themselves. Accordingly, Appellants argument is without merit. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS ARGUMENTS DO NOT ESTABLISH THAT UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 31A-15-105 AUTHORIZES PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
UTAH INSURANCE CODE. 
Appellees raise a variety of issues and cite a number of different statutes and cases in 
an apparent attempt to complicate the simple issue before this court, namely whether a 
private individual may enforce the Insurance Code by seeking a determination that an 
individual and/or entity is an "unauthorized insurer" under the law, thereby permitting the 
3 
private individual to exercise the rights set forth under the statute. These arguments are 
without merit. 
A. Appellees cite to no authority, statutory or otherwise, permitting them to 
privately seek a judicial determination relating to whether an individual 
and/or entity is an "unauthorized insurer" or that a given product 
complies with the provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. 
Appellees cite to Utah Code Ann §31 A-1-301 for the proposition that the statute 
defines "unauthorized insurer" to mean "unlicensed insurer." which is a "fact" they have 
alleged to be true. Utah Code Ann §31 A-l-301 (163)(a) states as follows: 
"Unauthorized insurer," "unadmitted insurer," or "nonadmitted insurer" 
means an insurer: 
(i) not holding a valid certificate of authority to do an insurance 
business in this state; or 
(ii) transacting business not authorized by a valid certificate. 
This statute does not support Appellees' contention, nor does it in any way abrogate or avoid 
the language of Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-2-201(l) and Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-2-201(6) which 
unambiguously state that the power to determine violations of the Insurance Code is solely 
vested in the Insurance Commissioner. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-201(l) ("[t]he 
commissioner shall administer and enforce this title"); Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-201(6) 
("[t]he commissioner shall inquire into violations of this title...to determine: (a) whether or 
not any person has violated any provision of this title; or (b) to secure information useful in 
the lawful administration of this title"). The determination of whether an insurer (1) requires 
a certificate of insurance to sell a given product and (2) has complied with the necessary 
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requirements to transact business is properly and exclusively left to the determination of the 
Insurance Commissioner. 
B. The criminal repercussions of such a determination are indicative of the 
legislature's intent against private enforcement 
Utah Code Ann §31A-15-102(5) provides for criminal sanctions for individuals 
involved in placing insurance without proper authorization. It is well established that private 
citizens and/or victims do not have standing to enforce criminal laws. See, e.g., State v. 
Leingang, 763 N.W.2d 769, 774 (N.D. 2009) ("victims are not parties to a criminal 
prosecution and generally do not have standing to challenge compliance with laws for 
victims' rights"); Cooper v. District Court, 133 P.3d 692, 695-714 (Alaska Ct.App.2006) 
(rejecting various arguments that victim had standing to challenge criminal sentence); Lamb 
v. Kontgias, 901 A.2d 860, 864-69 (Md. App. 2006) (same); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 
A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. Super. 1982) (same). Allowing Appellees to determine whether an 
insurer is unauthorized operates as a de-facto criminal prosecution. Such determinations 
must be left to those public entities specifically empowered to do so. 
C. The plain language of Utah Code Ann §31A-15-105 requires, as a 
threshold matter, that an insurer is determined to be "unauthorized" 
under the statute. 
Appellees argue that Appellants do not "discuss" the plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-15-105 or what "they believe it means." This is simply not true. Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-15-105 and its language is discussed at length in Appellants' initial brief. As 
argued in Appellants' opening brief, Utah Code Ann. §31 A-15-105 allows for the recovery 
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of insurance premiums in instances where the Insurance Code has been violated. It is that 
simple. Once an insurer has been determined to be unauthorized by the Insurance 
Commissioner, a private individual is then entitled to notify the insurer that he or she would 
like to void the policy. Having to operate through the confines of a regulatory scheme does 
not change the remedy being offered by the statute. Appellees would have this court ignore 
the regulatory scheme in favor of their isolated reading of the statute. Requiring insured 
individuals to operate through the Insurance Commissioner and the Insurance Department 
in order to ensure compliance and proper enforcement of the Utah Insurance Code does not 
conflict with the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §31 A-15-105. Instead, requiring 
individuals seeking redress through Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 to operate through the 
insurance department is consistent with the overall regulatory scheme. 
It is noteworthy that Appellees conveniently fail to even address the fact that other 
jurisdictions, when considering this same issue under similar statutory schemes, have, 
consistent with Utah, held that there is no private right of action for the violation of selling 
insurance without a license. See, e.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 812 So.2d309, 
312 (Ala. 2001) (holding that there is no private right of action for party alleging violation 
of selling insurance without a license); Peterson v. Cellco Partnership, 164 Cal.App.4th 
1583,1595,80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316,325 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2008) (holding that there is no private 
right of action for unlicensed sale of cellular phone insurance policies); Van Zanen v. Qwest 
Wireless, L.L.Q 550 F.Supp.2d 1261 (D. Colo. 2007), affd Van Zanen v. Qwest Wireless, 
6 
LLC, 522 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that there is no private right of action for 
unlicensed sale of insurance for wireless telephone equipment). 
D. Appellees citation and interpretation of legislative history is misleading 
and inaccurate. 
Appellees are correct in stating that the Utah Insurance Code, as presently written, is 
an amalgamation of various separate prior acts, including but not limited to the Unauthorized 
Insurers Act and the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act. However, Appellees incorrectly 
argue that Utah Code Ann. §31-35-1 previously granted a private right of action in 
connection with the enforcement of the Insurance Code against unauthorized insurers. Much, 
if not all, of the relevant language of Utah Code Ann. §31-3 5-1 was omitted by Appellees. 
This language speaks for itself: 
"The legislature declares that it is a subject of concern that many residents of 
this state hold policies of insurance issued or delivered in this state by insurers 
while not authorized to do business in this state, thus presenting to such 
residents the often insuperable obstacle of resorting to distant forums for 
the purpose of asserting legal rights under such policies. In furtherance of 
such state interest, the legislature herein provides a method of substituted 
service of process upon such insurers..." 
Utah Code Ann. §31-35-1 (1953). Thus, the purpose of Utah Code Ann. §31-35-1 was to 
provide a way in which individuals desiring to enforce their insurance policies could do so 
in Utah. Nothing in this statute in any way expressly provides, or even alludes to, a direct 
right of action by an individual to enforce the provisions of the Insurance Code against a 
purportedly unauthorized insurer. As stated previously, insurers can be, and often are, 
properly named in actions for declaratory relief and other suits to enforce the contractual 
7 
provisions contained within the policies of insurance they provide. Such suits are very 
different from suits brought against insurers for alleged violations of the Insurance Code 
itself. Appellants would have this court disregard that difference. 
Also, the addition of the term "voidable" in Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 does 
nothing to alter the fact that the statute may not be properly read in isolation, but rather must 
be read in light of the overall statutory scheme. Black's Law Dictionary cannot change this 
principle of statutory construction. 
E. Implied Right of Action Analysis is proper where nothing in the statute 
authorizes private enforcement of the Insurance Code and Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-15-105 cannot be read in isolation from the statutory scheme. 
Appellees further assert that their claimed remedy is an "express contract remedy." 
In doing so, Appellees again refuse to acknowledge or address the fact that all of the claims 
related to GAP and VTP are solely contingent on the issue of whether the Insurance Code 
has been violated. No amount of creative interpretation of the statute can avoid this simple 
fact. The relevant issue before this court on appeal is whether the Appellees, as individuals, 
have the right to bring suit against an "insurer" for alleged violations of the Insurance Code. 
To the extent that there is no statutory language authorizing an individual to bring a private 
action against an insurer for, among other things, failing to maintain the proper insurance 
license, an implied right of action analysis is necessary. 
F. Appellees' "Seven Reasons" do not address the underlying issue before 
this court. 
Appellees' provide "seven reasons" why the courts have jurisdiction and power to 
enforce Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105. Nevertheless, Appellees continue to refuse to 
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acknowledge or address the fact that all of the claims related to GAP and VTP are contingent 
on the issue of whether the Insurance Code has been violated and whether they, as 
individuals, have the right to bring suit against an "insurer" for alleged violations of the 
Insurance Code. Each of these "reasons" is without merit. The first reason, that court 
jurisdiction is presumed, does not make sense. The court's power to consider a matter is not 
being questioned. The question before this court is whether a private individual has the right 
to enforce the provisions of the Insurance Code and seek a determination of whether an 
insurer was "authorized" where the Utah Insurance Code expressly delegates this role to the 
Insurance Commissioner. It is not the court which does not have jurisdiction per se, rather 
there is no right to be enforced. A private individual is not entitled to enforce the Utah 
Insurance Code through private litigation. 
Second, the Appellees claim that the language of the statute describes court action. 
Appellants do not dispute that the statute references the courts. However, and by way of 
clarification, Appellants argument is that private individuals cannot use the courts to enforce 
the Insurance Code and thereby bypass the regulatory scheme imposed by the Utah Insurance 
Code. That a policy holder has the ability to avoid an insurance contract allegedly issued by 
an insurer ultimately determined to be unauthorized is not disputed. This is set forth in the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-105. However, the statute does not say that a 
private individual, unhappy with having paid a given premium, can decide to bring suit 
against that insurer for the purpose of determining whether an insurer has violated the 
9 
Insurance Code. Contrary to the claims of the Appellees, this is not a contract dispute. There 
is a significant difference between a contractual dispute, such as a breach of contract and/or 
bad faith claim, and an enforcement action such as this. As stated by the trial court, this is 
an action which entirely depends on the issue of whether the alleged "insurers" have violated 
the Utah Insurance Code. This determination is properly made by the Insurance 
Commissioner under the provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. 
The third reason, namely that the commissioner is appointed to receive process for 
unlicensed insurers, is also a red herring. Not to belabor the point, but the court's ability to 
handle these issues is adequately addressed in the framework of the regulatory scheme of the 
Utah Insurance Code. Appellees cannot simply pick and choose statutes, arguing that the 
"plain language" of the isolated statute supports their arguments and/or propositions. 
Instead, the entirety of the statutory scheme must be analyzed. Here, the Utah Insurance 
Code is clear in its mandate that the Insurance Commissioner, with the assistance of the 
courts, is empowered to take steps necessary to enforce the Insurance Code. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 3 lA-2-201(l) ("[t]he commissioner shall administer and enforce this title"); Utah 
Code Ann. § 31 A-2-201(6) ("[t]he commissioner shall inquire into violations of this title...to 
determine: (a) whether or not any person has violated any provision of this title; or (b) to 
secure information useful in the lawful administration of this title"). This is reinforced by 
the legislative cited in Appellants' initial brief That the Insurance Commissioner would 
accept process for unlicensed and/or out of state insurers is not indicative of any private right 
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of action. As stated previously, Appellants do not question whether a private individual has 
the ability to bring suit to enforce the provisions of an insurance contract. However, as 
discussed above, such actions are very different from the code enforcement action before this 
court. 
The fourth reason, namely that Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 
338 (Utah 2000) establishes that Utah Code Ann. §31A-15-105 is "substantive law" in the 
contract dispute skirts the issue before the court and disregards the language from the district 
court's ruling on the VTP and GAP issues. The district court specifically held that the VTP 
and GAP classes were all contingent on the issue of whether the Appellants had violated the 
Insurance Code. The Surety Underwriters decision does not state that Utah Code Ann. 
§31A-15-105 contains a private right of action or that courts may, at the request of a private 
individual, make determinations as to whether a given insurer is unauthorized. Surety 
Underwriters is very different from this case, as not only was Utah Code Ann. §31 A-15-105 
used merely as an affirmative defense, it was done so in a situation in which there was no 
dispute over whether the insurer was authorized. The case at hand is very different because 
the primary questions at issue in the GAP and VTP claims are, according to the trial court, 
"whether the [Appellants]' vehicle theft policies violate the Utah Insurance Code and, if so, 
which legal remedies are available" and whether "the [Appellants]' GAP policies violate the 
Utah Insurance Code, and if so, which legal remedies are available to the members of the 
class?" (ROA 2164-67, 2177). 
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The fifth reason is also without merit because this matter is not a contract enforcement 
matter, but rather a code enforcement matter. Appellees do not seek the enforcement of the 
benefits and rights conferred to them by way of the VTP and GAP contracts they entered 
into, nor do they allege any breach of contract on behalf of the alleged "insurers." Instead, 
Appellees seek to invalidate these contracts by citation to the Utah Insurance Code. 
Appellants do not allege individuals are not entitled to bring suit for breach of contract and/or 
bad faith in connection with their insurance policies. However, Appellants do assert that 
private individuals are not entitled to enforce the provisions of the Utah Insurance Code 
against insurers. This is a very real and significant distinction. Appellees apparently do not 
address this distinction, instead treating the instant action in similar fashion to a breach of 
contract action. Taking "into account the legislature's mandates" in a contract action, as 
stated by the court in Machan, is a very different proposition than a private enforcement 
action under the statute. See Machan v. UNUMLife Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P.3d 342,348 (Utah 
2005). Private enforcement is simply not allowed under the regulatory scheme of the Utah 
Insurance Code. 
The sixth reason is that a determination as to whether the insurers involved are 
"unauthorized" is not required by the statute since one of the elements of being an 
"unauthorized" insurer under the statute is not having a license. Appellees ignore that the 
issue of whether any of the insurers was unauthorized is disputed. Furthermore, Appellees 
oversimplify the issue of the determination of whether an insurer is "unauthorized." 
12 
Appellees also ignore the plain language relating to the determination of violations by the 
Insurance Commissioner. The reality is that the Insurance Commissioner is properly 
empowered, by statute, to address such issues. Otherwise, any individual that becomes 
displeased with his or her insurance policy, regardless of any dispute related to the terms of 
that policy, could, toward the end of a policy period, search some "list" of insurers and if his 
or her insurer is not on that list bring suit in order to recoup the money he or she paid under 
that policy. This kind of behavior would create a unprecedented burden on the courts and 
insurers and is precisely what the Utah Insurance Code's regulatory structure is designed to 
prevent. 
Additionally, Appellees arguments relating to Utah Code Ann. §31 A-2-201(4)(b) are 
immaterial to the issue before this court. Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-201(4) unambiguously 
allows the Insurance Commissioner to issue orders "to implement the provisions of this title." 
These duties necessarily include the enforcement of the Utah Insurance Code, including but 
not limited to taking whatever actions are necessary to comply with the Code. Although 
Appellees argue that they are not subject to regulation, the very nature of their action 
illustrates that they would, per the statute, be "affected" by an order of the Commissioner. 
As such, their argument is disingenuous and without merit. 
Finally, the seventh reason given for jurisdiction is that Utah Code Ann. §31 A-15-105 
is "substantive law" and is binding "as if its terms are written into the contract." Appellees 
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are again attempting to confuse the present action with a contract enforcement action3. As 
explained above, the present action is not a contract enforcement action and, as such, the 
precedent cited is inapposite. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CERTIFYING THE 
VTP, GAP AND DOC FEES CLASSES AS ITS ANALYSIS WAS NOT 
RIGOROUS AND FAILED TO ADDRESS SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES 
WITHIN THE CLASSES. 
Under Utah law, "the trial court may certify a class only if, after rigorous analysis, it 
determines that the proposed class satisfies the prerequisites of [Rule] 23(a)." JB. exrel Hart 
v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1287-88 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). In seeking 
certification, Appellees have the burden of establishing that certification is proper. See Ditty 
v. Check Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 639, 641 (D. Utah 1998). 
In Appellees brief, Appellees erroneously argue and imply that the additional 
information and facts provided to the district court by the Appellants should not be 
considered. This is unsupported by any valid precedent and is simply incorrect. The factual 
allegations of the complaint are to be construed as true, nothing more. As stated above, the 
trial court had the duty to examine all of the relevant facts presented and perform a "rigorous 
analysis" with regard to whether certification of the VTP, GAP and Doc Fees classes was 
proper. As explained in Appellants' initial brief, this did not occur. Furthermore, the 
various contentions in Appellees brief are, in large part, without merit as set forth below. 
3There are no complaints that the bargained-for benefits of the GAP and VTP 
contracts were not provided to Appellees as promised. 
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A. Appellees' opinions and legal conclusions relating to VTP products, GAP 
insurers and Appellants limited lines licenses are not facts. 
As part of their argument, Appellees have unilaterally determined that the VTP 
products4 being sold "insurance" and that the sellers of these "insurance" products require 
a specific insurance license above and beyond those held by the Appellants. Appellees later 
argue, in relation to the GAP policies, that although they concede that Appellants had limited 
lines licenses to sell credit insurance, the sources of this insurance were not properly 
authorized to do business in Utah. Appellees even devote significant argument to a 
purported differentiation between "waiver" and other GAP insurance. As explained above, 
these determinations are not "facts" but rather they are legal conclusions and opinions. Such 
arguments only re-emphasize the specialized nature of the insurance inquiry and the purpose 
for which the legislature delegated responsibility and power for such inquiries to the 
Insurance Commissioner. To hold otherwise would improperly usurp the authority of the 
Insurance Commissioner. 
B. The common plan or scheme language is taken directly from the 
precedent cited by Appellees. 
The Appellees argue that the language "common plan or scheme" is not indicative of 
the standard applicable in this case. This is ironic because the two cases cited by Appellees 
4Contrary to Appellees claims, Appellants have not admitted that the VTP products 
sold are "insurance." Rather, Appellants have, for the purpose of Appellants' appeal, 
acknowledged that the Trial Court certified the VTP classes based on the notion that the only 
common question was whether these products violated the Utah Insurance Code. Appellants 
continue in their belief and claim that the VTP products are not insurance and further claim 
that Appellees, as private individuals, do not have standing to bypass the Insurance 
Commissioner in an attempt to regulate the sale of such products. 
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in moving for certification of the VTP classes were certified specifically because there was 
a common plan or scheme. See Roy Veal v. Crown Auto Dealerships, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 572 
(M.D. Fla. 2006) and Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 214 F.R.D. 207 (S.D. Ohio 2003). 
Appellees cannot rely on these cases for certification before one court and then disavow this 
precedent on appeal. To the extent that this precedent applies, the facts and language of these 
cases should be considered by this court. 
C. The trial court's general, sweeping determination relating to the VTP 
classes ignores significant factual discrepancies and differences among the 
members of the purported classes. 
The Appellees argue that the trial court's assertion that "the issues are not so 
complicated as argued by the defendants" was correct. (ROA 2164). In making this broad, 
sweeping determination in one sentence, the trial court failed and/or refused to address a 
multitude of varied factual and legal issues pertaining to the Appellees' VTP claims. Indeed, 
in their brief, Appellees acknowledge several of the differences inherent in the VTP classes, 
namely that the benefits paid vary greatly, that there are different providers involved, and that 
the amount paid for these products varied significantly5. As stated in Appellants initial brief, 
there are numerous additional, critical questions that must be asked in connection with the 
VTP claims that will vary from individual to individual. These questions include, among 
others, (A) Which type of VTP product was purchased? (B) From which dealership was it 
5Appellees state that they do not have more recent sales numbers for the dealerships. 
However, both dealerships have been out of business for some time and, as such, there are 
no, and will be no, updated sales numbers relating to VTP, GAP or Doc Fees . 
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purchased? (C) In what year was the VTP product purchased? (D) Who was the administrator 
of the VTP program? (E) Did the administrator have an insurance underwriter for its VTP 
product? (F) Who was the underwriter when the VTP product at issue was purchased? (G) 
Was the underwriter licensed and registered with the state? (H) What were the terms of the 
VTP product agreement? (I) Was the particular VTP contract registered with the State of 
Utah? (J) What promises were contained in the particular VTP contract? (K) Did the terms 
of the VTP contract include a monetary benefit? (L) Etc. 
These issues and questions were provided to the trial court. Any remedy provided 
without answering these questions will likely fail to address the individual claims of the class 
members. The trial court did not explain or justify its decision to disregard such inquiries, 
choosing instead to merely state "the issues are not so complicated as argued by the 
defendants." This is not a "rigorous inquiry" as required by the statute. At least some 
justification should be given for the complete disregard of these relevant inquiries. 
D. The trial court's general, sweeping determination relating to the GAP 
classes ignores significant factual discrepancies and differences among the 
members of the purported classes. 
The Appellees' GAP claims were also improperly certified by the trial court due to 
an oversimplification of the issues before the court. As a threshold matter, Appellees GAP 
classes rely solely on the premise that the GAP insurance coverage procured by Appellants 
over the years did not comply with Utah insurance law, despite Appellants acknowledged 
license to sell such insurance coverage. Such a determination is not a factual determination 
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to be made at the request of a private citizen, but rather falls within the scope and power of 
the Insurance Department and Insurance Commissioner, as explained above. 
Appellees's reply brief again over-simplifies the GAP issue. As set forth in 
Appellants initial memorandum, Appellants provided evidence that there were a variety of 
different administrators and underwriters involved in the provision of GAP coverage. The 
terms of these policies would also change, even among the same administrators and/or 
underwriters. Given these facts, and others, Appellants raised a number of questions before 
the trial court as being critical to any analysis as to the determination of the GAP insurance 
claims. These inquires include, among others, the following: (A) When was the policy 
purchased? (B) From which dealership was it purchased? (C) Who was the administrator of 
the GAP program? (D) Was the program a "waiver" program or a traditional "insurance" 
program? (E) Did the administrator have an insurance underwriter for its GAP product? (F) 
If so, who is the underwriter? (G) Who was the underwriter when the policy at issue was 
purchased? (H) Is the underwriter licensed and registered with the Commission? (I) What are 
the terms of the GAP agreement? (J) Is the GAP agreement registered with the State of 
Utah? (K) Was the underlying financing contract between the dealership and the purchaser 
assigned to a third-party financial institution? (L) Who is considered the lender in this 
particular transaction? (M) On what forms were the GAP policies issued? (N) Were the 
forms approved by the State of Utah? (O) Etc. 
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The trial court did not address these inquires or otherwise explain in any detail why 
these issues would not need to be resolved on an individual basis in order to arrive at a proper 
class remedy. Similar to the VTP issue, this was not a "rigorous" inquiry. Since the trial 
court failed to conduct a rigorous inquiry, it has abused its discretion in certifying the GAP 
insurance classes. 
E. The trial court's general, sweeping determination relating to the Doc Fees 
classes ignores significant factual discrepancies and differences among the 
members of the purported classes. 
The certification of the Doc Fees issue by the trial court is even more significant in 
its oversimplification of the issue than the GAP and VTP certifications. As mentioned in 
Appellees' brief, Appellees have alleged that Appellants have violated "all" of the applicable 
laws relating to doc fees. This over-broad statement underlines the breadth of the inquiry 
that will need to be undertaken in order to ensure that the "class" is properly represented. 
Appellees claim violations relating to advertising, selling, and consumer protection statutes, 
among others. Nevertheless, the trial court certified only two classes, one for each 
dealership. The claims require a multitude of different inquiries, the vast majority of which 
require inquiry on an individual basis. 
For example, with regard to the claim that Appellants violated the Motor Vehicle 
Business Regulation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-1 et. seq., Appellees cite to a number of 
statutes governing such a claim. Under these statutes, determining whether there has been 
a violation will require an inquiry into, among other things, (1) whether there was a "pencil" 
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created in the subject transaction, (2) whether this pencil, as used in a given transaction, can 
be classified as an "advertisement", (3) whether the pencil contains an "advertized price," 
and (4) whether this advertise price includes "all charges." Utah Administrative Code, Rule 
R877-23 V-7. This is but one of at least 8 separate claims for violation of Utah statutes, all 
of which have specific elements that must be established and which require inquiry on an 
individual basis. As stated in Appellants' initial brief, the trial court was presented with 
numerous issues that would have to be considered in connection with each of the alleged Doc 
Fees violations in order to arrive at an adequate class-wide remedy, assuming one exists. The 
trial court, however, did not address these inquires or concerns in any meaningful depth. 
Upon making passing note of the concerns and issues raised by Appellants, the trial 
court held that 
"the [Appellees] have requested one remedy for the defendants' alleged 
violations: a return of all dealer documentary service fees charged to members 
of the proposed class. It appears that this remedy is based on one key question: 
did the defendants' actions violate the law and thus render the documentary fee 
provisions of the sales contract invalid? That question is common to all 
members of the proposed classes." 
(ROA 2167-68). What is not acknowledged by the trial court is that a determination as to 
whether the "Appellants actions violate the law" is wholly dependent on numerous inquiries 
that must be made at the individual level and that a given remedy will most likely not apply 
to all of the members of the class. These inquiries are set forth in more detail in Appellants 
initial brief. The trial court's decision to simplify these inquiries and claims into one over-
arching general question asking "whether defendants' actions violate the law" is not a 
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rigorous inquiry, nor is it a valid common question. Indeed, were this to qualify as a 
"common question" nearly any business could be subject to a class action by any number of 
its customers under the guise that they want their money back "if that business's actions 
violate the law." Such suits are contrary to the purpose and intent of Rule 23. Since the trial 
court failed to perform a rigorous inquiry in finding a common question, it abused its 
discretion in certifying the Doc Fees classes. 
F. The class representatives are inadequate. 
Regardless of the semantics argued by Appellees, the testimony given by the class 
representatives demonstrates their lack of interest in the class action in general. Each 
testified that they were primarily concerned with their individual claims against the 
Appellants, which are not a part of the class action. Furthermore, although ignorance is not 
the sole factor demonstrating inadequacy as a class representative, it does carry some weight. 
See Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd. 182 F.R.D. 639, 642 (D. Utah 1998). Thus, for the reasons set 
forth in Appellants initial brief, the class representatives are inadequate. 
G. Superiority is not met. 
Appellees argue that the superiority test does not refer to class representatives, but 
rather to the class members themselves and their desire to prosecute claims on their own. 
Even taking Appellees arguments as correct, the superiority requirement is still not met. 
With regard to the insurance-related claims, the class representatives are essentially seeking 
that the GAP and VTP products they purchased be declared void. These products have real 
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value and most if not all of the class members freely chose to purchase these products for the 
amounts indicated in their various contracts. To simply void these transactions without the 
class members' consent violates the superiority requirement as these individuals can and 
should pursue such remedies to the extent that they individually choose to do so. 
Furthermore, the argument with regard to the amounts at stake is a red herring. With 
regard to the GAP and VTP claims, the amounts paid are not the only amounts at stake, as 
the benefit purchased with these products is potentially worth much more than the premium 
paid. Furthermore, the hundreds of dollars at stake in the "Doc Fees" classes are significant 
enough that individuals with complaints about such fees can, and should, bring these claims 
on their own. Contrary to the implication of Appellees' counsel, there is no requirement that 
these individuals pay an attorney to prosecute these matters. The small claims court exists 
for the sole purpose of addressing such claims. The small claims court is properly and 
adequately equipped to address any individual's claim for the improper charging of a $300-
500 Doc Fee by exploring the unique facts and circumstances surrounding the claimant's 
vehicle purchase transaction. The class action, however, is not the proper venue for such 
inquiries, especially in light of their fact-intensive nature. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated in Appellants' initial brief, the lower court's ruling denying Appellants' 
Motion to Dismiss was in error and should be reversed. No private right of action exists 
under Utah law to enforce provisions of the Insurance Code. 
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Further, the lower court abused its discretion in certifying the Doc Fee, VTP and GAP 
classes. Each certification fails, on multiple levels, to meet the requirements of Rule 23 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The ruling of the lower court with regard to the 
certification of the Doc Fee, VTP and GAP classes should also be reversed. 
DATED this < day of October, 2009. 
KIPP AND/CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
HEI 
SCOTT C. POWERS 
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